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The Possibility of a Scientific Approach to Analytic
Theology Andrew TorranceUniversity of St Andrews
Abstract: A question that is often asked of analytic theologians is: what,if anything, distinguishes analytic theology from philosophy ofreligion? In this essay, I consider two approaches to what is called“analytic theology.” I argue that the first approach, which I associatewith the common practice of analytic theology in the university, is verydifficult to distinguish consistently from philosophy of religion. I alsoargue, however, that there is another approach that can be more clearlydistinguished from philosophy of religion (generally understood).Following Aquinas, I associate this with a scientific approach to analytictheology: an approach that is distinguished by a specific commitmentto understanding the mind-independent reality of God and all things inrelation to God. The primary aim of this essay is to present an accountof this latter approach and ask whether it might be possible to take suchan approach in the contemporary university.
There is a wide range of views about what precisely constitutes analytic theology.While there is general agreement that it is characterized by such virtues as “logicalrigour, clarity, and parsimony of expression” (Crisp 2009, 19; see also McCall 2015,17; Rea 2009, 5–6), there is a reluctance to establish too narrow a definition ofanalytic theology—one that may end up excluding too many voices from theconversation it seeks to create. In this respect, it is like every other area of theology;its precise nature is hard to pin down. Consequently, there is a diversity of approachestaking place within this conversation. On the one hand, some work in analytictheology resembles that being undertaken by systematic theologians. On the otherhand, some looks a lot like work being undertaken in the name of analytic philosophyof religion. This invites a common question: “What distinguishes (or does notdistinguish) analytic theology from systematic theology, on the one hand, andphilosophy of religion, on the other?” The situation is further complicated by the factthat there is a diversity of views as to how to answer this question.1 Withoutrehearsing these, let me offer a couple of short responses by way of introduction.On the one hand, analytic theology can be distinguished from systematictheology by its recognition that philosophers in the analytic tradition have a
1 See, for example, William Abraham 2009 and 2013; Max Baker-Hytch 2016; Oliver Crisp 2017; AlvinPlantinga 1992; Eleonore Stump 2013; and Nicholas Wolterstorff 2009.
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constructive contribution to make at the theological table. Having said that, it is notclear why analytic philosophy cannot have this role in systematic theology;consequently, it is not entirely clear why there is a need to draw a sharp distinctionbetween analytic and systematic theology. Yet there has been a lack of interactionbetween systematic theologians and analytic philosophers, and so the analytictheology movement addresses this by facilitating a conversation in which thisinteraction is encouraged. Within this conversation, the theologian recognizes thather theological reflection is accountable, in various ways, to critical questioning byanalytic philosophers. Moreover, not only is she open to critical engagement fromsuch quarters, she actively seeks such engagement because she believes it is of serviceto the theological task. This is not because she thinks that analytic argumentation will“establish or create faith,” as James Arcadi notes, but because she thinks that it can“enable one who already believes the articles of faith to do so with greater confidenceand clarity” (2017, 40). How, more precisely, the relationship between analyticphilosophy and theology should be construed requires its own discussion—one thatis beyond the scope of this essay.On the other hand, how might we distinguish analytic theology fromphilosophy of religion? I argue that if we are to recognize that there is somethingdistinctive about the nature of theology, there are good reasons to draw a sharperdistinction between these two disciplines. However, as I will show, in the academiccontext there are understandable reasons why drawing too sharp a distinction can beproblematic. Nonetheless, I shall also contend that, even in the university, there areways to appreciate the uniqueness of the theological task; and I shall argue that theuniqueness of analytic theology lies in what I shall refer to as a commitment to being“scientific.”Now, clearly, the term “scientific” is a loaded term and, in our contemporaryculture, tends to be associated with a naturalistic methodology.2 For the purposes ofthis essay, however, I shall follow Aquinas and use this term as it has been usedthroughout the history of theology—as scientia. Used in this way, it refers to theologyas an endeavor to understand a mind-independent object in a way that is true to thenature of that object. As Karl Barth puts it, to be scientific is to be “thrown up againstreality” with an “unconditional respect for the uniqueness of its chosen theme” (1922,515). So when the term is applied to theology, it serves to acknowledge that the taskof theology should be characterized by a commitment to understanding God and all
things in relation to God (GATRG) in a way that is accountable to the true nature ofGATRG (see Aquinas 2006, I.1.7) and takes into account God’s self-disclosure.
Scientific Analytic Theology: an approach to analytic theology in whichthe theologian is expected to approach and give an account of GATRGin a way that seeks to correspond to or track the reality of GATRG.
2 For this reason, some people might prefer me to use a different term––one that does not tend to beassociated with the empirical scientific method of the natural sciences. However, my deep appreciationfor the rich heritage that this term has had in the theological tradition means that I prefer to use thisterm. Nonetheless, I recognize that others might prefer to use a different term such as “theoscientific.”Another possibility would be to talk about a theological approach to theology, which could beassociated with what John Webster refers to as “theological theology (2005, 11-32; see also 2015).
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By being scientific in this way, the Christian analytic theologian aligns herself with themany theologians whose approach can be defined in these terms, including those whohave explicitly viewed the task of theology as the scientific study of GATRG: includingThomas Aquinas, Bonaventure, Frances Turretin, Karl Barth, T.F. Torrance, and JohnWebster. With this commitment, the Christian analytic theologian follows the adviceof Tom McCall who notes that “the task of the theologian is not merely to say thingsabout God (or God-and-everything)—it is to speak truly of God (so far as we can) andto do so in a way that celebrates the glory of God’s being and actions” (2015, 170)Furthermore, the Christian analytic theologian acknowledges Nicholas Wolterstorff’scall upon theologians to study “how things look when seen in the light of the triuneGod—may his name be praised!—who creates and sustains us, who redeems us, andwho will bring this frail and fallen, though yet glorious, humanity and cosmos toconsummation” (2005, 91–92). As Oliver Crisp notes, these words from Wolterstorff“are surely words to live by.” Crisp then adds: “Let us pursue our theologizing . . . tothe greater glory of God” (2017, 165).Before proceeding to discuss the scientific nature of analytic theology, it isrelevant to clarify the place of theology amongst the plurality of voices thatcharacterize the contemporary university—a community that (to varying extents andin various ways) recognizes a place for “freedom of academic expression.” So, in thefirst section of this paper, I shall consider the objection that to describe analytictheology as “scientific,” in the way that I am doing, risks tying it to a form ofexclusivism that, while appropriate in some seminary contexts, would beinappropriate in the university. So, to tread cautiously, I acknowledge that there areat least two ways to think about what we call “theology”: one that is more generic andone that is more concrete—with the latter being distinguished by its scientificcharacter. What I shall also note is that the more generic understanding of analytictheology is not so easily distinguished from philosophy of religion. On this point, oneof the things I aim to do in this essay is communicate that while it may be possible todefine analytic theology in (at least) these two different ways, it is also important toavoid confusing these two versions of analytic theology, lest our understanding“GATRG” be domesticated by the prevailing ideology of a university. If these twoversions are confused, then the reality of GATRG (the object of scientific theology)risks being reduced to a mind-dependent object of philosophy of religion—to humanthoughts about GATRG (which is often the object of the kind of theology we find inthe university).At the same time, I shall also try to think about how we might recognize a placefor scientific theology within university departments of theology that are expected toconform to a more generic definition of theology. In keeping with the university’scommitment to diversity and inclusion, I shall go on to argue that being true to one’sfaith commitments might be a critical part of the analytic theological task; indeed, Ishall argue that if a person is to take a scientific approach to analytic theology, this isessential. In so doing I shall advocate an approach that is likely to clash with someacademic commitments to diplomacy in the study of religion—approaches that tendto disregard the theological conviction that characterizes orthodox religious belief.
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The somewhat divergent nature of my approach will become apparent in someof the more radical claims I propose in later sections. The radicality of these claimswill correlate to my argument that if analytic theology is to be decisively distinguishedfrom philosophy of religion, it will need to seek to be scientific, in the theologicalsense. To consider what a scientific approach might look like, the final section of thisessay shall propose some distinguishing features of a Christian’s scientific approachto analytic theology.I shall conclude by acknowledging that the religious believer who teachestheology in the modern university may well need to approach analytic theology in away that makes it indistinguishable from philosophy of religion. If so, however, shecan recognize that there may well need to be more to the task of analytic theology asit is free to operate outside the ideological boundaries of her university setting—as itis free to seek to understand GATRG in a way that more fully conforms to the realityof GATRG.
1. Theology in the UniversityIn universities that continue to have a place for the academic study of theology,theology tends to be treated as something like the study of a system of beliefs to whichreligious minds assent or have assented in the past. Generally speaking, and speakingdescriptively, its mode in the university is loosely distinguished from religiousstudies, which tends to take a more detached sociological approach, focusing onmaking observations about the genealogy, history, practices, and artifacts of religiouscommunities. One could say that theology looks more like a blend of religious studiesand philosophy of religion (if we are to separate these two disciplines), insofar as itpays more attention to the nature, content, and structure of religious thought. At thesame time, in the university, it is difficult to draw a hard and fast distinction betweentheology and religious studies or philosophy of religion, and there is unlikely to beany pressure to do so.Within the university, the religious beliefs that the theologian studies can beassociated with a wide range of religious traditions. There can be Hindu, Islamic,Jewish, and Christian theology; there may even be non-theistic theology such asBuddhist theology and, indeed, classes that explore agnostic and atheistic beliefs inthe name of theology. So the theology student will find that, according to theuniversity, the term “theology” is not tied to a specific religious tradition—to theextent that theology students may have the chance to study the theologies of aplurality of religious traditions. On a related note, if a student decides to undertake atheology degree at university, she will find that there is no expectation for her to havea specific religious commitment.Under these circumstances “theology” is not strictly committed tounderstanding GATRG. Rather, it seeks to understand something like: (1) an absolute
telos (usually a transcendent being such as God or, increasingly, whatever is thesubject-matter of “spirituality”), as it is perceived by and gives shape to a specificreligious tradition; and (2) the different stories, philosophies, worldviews, and
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teleologies that emerge when communities grow according to what they perceive tobe their absolute telos.This more generic understanding of theology is given careful consideration byWilliam Wood, who has done some of the finest work on defining the task of analytictheology. Wood connects analytic theology with a philosophical theology that “makesno appeals to authority or to private revelatory experiences to defends its claims”(2014, 597). He associates this philosophical theology with Alvin Plantinga who,when claiming that “it is rational to interpret the Bible by the light of faith,” does notground “the soundness of that claim . . . in the Bible, or faith, or private revelatoryexperiences, but in general philosophical arguments, available to all, about the natureof rational belief” (2014, 597). In a later article, he goes on to refer to this approachmore specifically as the formal model of analytic theology. According to this model,Wood writes,a theologian does not need to adhere to any substantive theological orphilosophical views in order to count as an analytic theologian. Sheonly needs to explicate whatever substantive views she does hold usingthe tools and methods of analytic philosophy. (2016, 255)At the same time, Wood also recognizes another model of analytic theology that“describes a substantive theological program”. On this model, theologydraws on the tools and methods of analytic philosophy to advance aspecific theological agenda, one that is, broadly speaking, associatedwith traditional Christian orthodoxy. On this conception, the centraltask of analytic theology is to develop philosophically well-groundedaccounts of traditional Christian doctrines like the Trinity, Christology,and the atonement. For the most part, analytic theologians addressthese doctrines not from any specific confessional or ecclesialstandpoint, but from a position that aims to be broadly orthodox. To besure, some analytic theologians avowedly do write from within aconfessional tradition. Nevertheless, because their work is usuallygrounded in philosophical arguments that are in principle accessible toall, rather than in appeals to narrowly confessional authority, theirtheology bids for cross-confessional interest. (2016, 255)While this model may be more substantive, Wood does not tie this model to a person’sspecific religious commitments. On this understanding, it would be no less theologicalfor an atheist “to develop philosophically well-grounded accounts of traditionalChristian doctrines” (2016, 255) than it would be for a Christian to do so. This isbecause, for Wood, a person’s own theological commitments cannot be considered tobe relevant to whether she can participate in a substantive theological program.This does not mean that there won’t be subjective differences between therespective agendas that drive different religious/non-religious believers in the studyof theology. This is inevitable. Suppose, for example, that a Christian and an atheistare both taking a course on the doctrine of the Trinity. Whereas a Christian is likely
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to undertake theological study in this area for the sake of learning about GATRG, theatheist will be likely to pursue such study for the sake of understanding the Christianunderstanding of GATRG. However, according to the judgement of the university, thequestion of whether or not a theological position actually corresponds to GATRG (i.e.,whether it is scientific) is beside the point. This is because the university does notjudge accountability to God as a virtue to which any of its scholars (even itstheologians) should aspire.So, it is not hard to see why the university context is going to be awkward forthe task of something called “theology.” Indeed, there is good reason to think that itmakes more sense to associate the atheist’s approach to theology with suchdisciplines as philosophy of religion, history, sociology, religious studies, or, as Iconsider below, “atheology.” Why? Because, clearly, the atheist’s study (-logia) hasnothing to do with God (Theos). The atheist focuses her attention on studying (whatshe perceives to be) the creative imaginings of the theist. At the same time, this doesnot mean that an atheist’s work cannot be seen to contribute to the theist’s endeavorto understand GATRG. For example, there is no reason why an atheist could not writea book on the doctrine of the Trinity that the Christian could interpret as a piece ofgood theology, despite the fact that the atheist does not think her work has anythingto do with the triune God (whom she believes to be nothing more than anunwarranted projection of the Christian imagination). It should be noted, of course,that the ability of such a book to serve Christian thought cannot be relevant towhether an academic scholar judges it to be a good piece of theology according to thecriteria of the university.Under these circumstances, theologians appear to be obliged to recognize thatmuch of what the university views as theology could also be described as philosophyof religion, history, sociology, or religious studies. Indeed, most theologians acceptthis (at least functionally). A quick scan through any number of leading academicjournals will show that a great deal of systematic and modern theology focuses on thehistory of theological ideas (such as those of Augustine, Aquinas, Calvin, etc.); a greatdeal of practical theology looks a lot like sociology of religion; and a great deal ofanalytic theology looks a lot like philosophy of religion. While such work may notdirectly serve to develop our knowledge of GATRG, there is no question that aChristian can draw upon it to serve this purpose. Throughout the life of the Church,the history of theological investigation, the analysis of religious communities, and thephilosophical study of religious ideas have all been drawn upon to serve the study ofGATRG. Moreover, if there were no place for this kind of scholarship, it is hard to knowhow the discipline that Christians call “theology” could exist.While it may be possible for the university to have a more generic approach totheology, which is not tied to the study of GATRG, this does not mean that there arenot valid reasons why religious believers might not want scholars from otherreligious or non-religious persuasions to teach theology in their seminary context.For example, Muslims are likely to think that the religious commitments of an Islamicprofessor will make her more committed to providing a true presentation of Allahthan a Christian professor would. For this reason, most Islamic seminaries willexclude Christians from teaching in their theological programs—just as most
The Possibility of a Scientific Approach to Analytic Theology Andrew Torrance
184
Christian seminaries will exclude Muslims from teaching in their theologicalprograms.At the same time, there are also good reasons why religious thinkers might behappy for the discipline of theology to be defined more generally in a way that allowssafe harbor for a plurality of (1) conversation partners, (2) religious/non-religiousaffiliations, and (3) disciplinary interests—as is the case in the university. Whateverthe religious/non-religious tradition with which one associates theology, there canbe a recognition that the theological world is greatly diminished if: (1) it refuses tolisten to the voices of those outside one’s own particular religious tradition; (2) itrefuses to recognize that there are other religious traditions whose adherents aresincerely committed to knowing the truth; and (3) it seeks to ignore the historical,cultural, social, philosophical, natural scientific, and other work that is beingundertaken and which makes no reference to God. By disregarding the plurality ofvoices that make up the world at large, theology will become characterized by anisolationism that will undermine its capacity to engage with the world as it is.Furthermore, it will also fail to ask of its own commitments and suppositions thekinds of questions that such engagement generates.This raises the key question: if theology takes on the identity that theuniversity imposes on it, why distinguish the task of theology from the philosophy ofreligion, religious studies, or history of religious thought when it is undertaken in thecontext of the university? As I consider below, there are good reasons for universitiesto allow room for a discipline wherein persons can seek to know GATRG in a way thatcorresponds to their respective beliefs. Again, this is what I call scientific theologybecause of its commitment to being true to the mind-independent object (or subject)of theology (God), in a way that is accountable to the self-revelation of that object.Such a pursuit is a distinctively theological task that does not easily fall under thecategory “philosophy of religion.” Why not? Because, for the vast majority of thosewho believe in God, religion is accountable to the living God; God is not merely aprojection of human philosophy or religion. Consequently, the study of GATRG cannotsimply be a thought-project undertaken independently of and in abstraction from anyact of self-disclosure on God’s part. The affirmations of the faithful theologian cannotbe subject to the predeterminations of a thought-project that is operating with aforeign set of criteria. For her, theology cannot reject or bracket out the recognitionof God’s being, nature, and purposes, if it is to be committed to rigorous engagementwith the questions at the heart of her respective theistic tradition.Now, if there is to be a space within universities for religious believers topursue scientific theology, they will be required to do so alongside persons who arepursuing “theology” in a different way and from different epistemic affiliations andcommitments—a way that, from their theological perspective, may well seem moreakin to philosophy of religion or religious studies. For some, this may generatediscomfort or even confusion. But at the end of the day this is a bullet that they willneed to bite if they are to enjoy the many benefits that come from pursuing thetheological task in the context of the plural affiliations and commitments that definethe contemporary university. While such a context may again seem like a strangehabitat for theological endeavor, it is worth noting that the strangeness of this habitatconforms to the strangeness of the world in which the theologian lives—in which the
The Possibility of a Scientific Approach to Analytic Theology Andrew Torrance
185
theologian is not simply called to preach to the choir but is also called to be (what maybe to others) a voice crying in the wilderness (as those other voices may also seemfrom the perspective of the faithful theologian).
2. Scientific Analytic TheologyBefore elaborating on how I construe the scientific nature of analytic theology, let mebegin by addressing a possible retort to the suggestion that analytic theology can bescientific. Being scientific requires synthetic reasoning, which, according to theanalytic/synthetic distinction (as we find in Kant, for example), is to be distinguishedfrom analytic reasoning. In response to this, let me make this brief point: if the“analytic” of analytic theology is the “analytic” of the traditional analytic/syntheticdistinction, then there is no possibility of a Christian analytic theology. Christiananalytic theology must be shaped continuously by the historically and empiricallyformed propositions of Scripture and the Church. The truth of theologicalpropositions cannot ultimately be assessed by simply exploring the meanings of theconstituent terms. Rather, theological affirmations are true according to thetruthfulness of their witness to God’s self-disclosure to the contingent order in space-time. They are known, therefore, by non-deductive a posteriori means.What, then, do I mean by a scientific approach to theology? As I noted in theintroduction, scientific theology is committed to understanding GATRG in a way thatis accountable to the true nature of GATRG. It does not interpret God in merelysubjective terms, as a human projection: a human belief, conceptual postulate, socialconstruct, character in a story, etc. Rather, it seeks to bear witness to the mind-independent reality of God—the living God to whom the true account of GATRG mustcorrespond and can do so because of God’s self-disclosure.Now, in endorsing a scientific approach to analytic theology, an accompanyingcommitment to transparency requires me to be open about the fact that I am aChristian. This is because I believe that the task of referring truly to GATRG requiresme to speak Christianly. This will necessarily have an impact on the way I approachthe topic of this paper (particularly in what follows). If I am to approach thetheological task scientifically, I must recognize the way in which my own faith makesa decisive difference to how I understand the true nature of GATRG.As a Christian theologian, I understand that the true and proper object ofscientific theology is: (1) the triune God, according to God’s self-revelation; and (2)creation, according to what God reveals creation to be before God. These things areknown according to God’s revelation in and through history as it is attested to in theBiblical witness, the creeds, and the intellectual history of the Church. While myattention could be given to a broad range of matters concerning GATRG, the centralfocus of my attention is the one who most fully reveals (1) and (2): the creative Dabarbecome flesh, the one through whom and for whom all things were created, the soleliving mediator between God and humankind, the risen and ascended Jesus Christ.Accordingly, as I shall discuss further below, I also understand that my judgementmust be shaped and informed by the kinds of activity that correspond to the life of the
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Church, the “body of Christ”. That is, theology must not simply be undertaken inservice of the Church; it must also grow out of and be sustained by the one true Lordwho is the source of the life of the Church, and all its forms of speech, confession, andfaithful God-talk.In short, as a Christian, I understand that the scientific task of the analytictheologian must be to employ her analytic skills in the service of witness to God’s self-disclosure as Word or Logos, in the person of Jesus Christ. As such, any commitmentto argumentative rigor, clarity, and precision should only be recognized as valuableinsofar as it helps the Church to offer a fresh, faithful, and disciplined witness to God’sself-disclosure as incarnate Logos. What this means more precisely will be discussedin the penultimate section of this essay.It is not hard to see why such an approach to theology could be dismissed asconveying, if not endorsing, an exclusively Christian form of theological arrogance.And, in the context of the university, such a criticism is likely to be particularlypointed. This is because, again, the university theologian is (normally) expected torecognize and, indeed, respect the fact that there can be a plurality of views aboutwhat informs the task of theology, depending on who or what a person thinks theobject denoted as “god” might be. Hence, we are presented with an obvious challenge:how can a religious believer take a scientific approach to theology in a way that alignswith the university’s respect for diversity? The answer is clear. A genuine respect fordiversity requires the university to respect the real differences that distinguishreligious believers—differences that entail a commitment to beliefs that areincompatible with the religious beliefs of other religious and non-religious traditions.
3. Scientific Theology among Religious and Non-Religious
TraditionsSo, what is required if the university is to provide a safe place for an open and diverseconversation about theology? Does it require theology never to be tied to a particularreligious (or ideological or philosophical) tradition?The first thing to note is that, if a theology department is to be genuinely opento engaging with a diversity of religious and non-religious traditions, it cannotpresuppose any particular dogma or “-ism.”3 Clearly, this refers not only to religiouscommitments but also to the dogmas of atheistic secularism and naturalism, whichare too often mistaken to be “neutral” or “objective.” It also refers to the influentialdogmas of inclusivism, relativism, and pluralism, which are sometimes mistaken tobe essentially inclusive (see Plantinga 1997, 2000). Given that the university isobliged to treat most truth-claims as provisional (so as to invite falsification), theuniversity should be open to diverse approaches to the theological task, and this willrequire scholars to recognize the mutual exclusivity of their divergent epistemic
3 The Latin “universitas” means “whole.” So, if it is in keeping with its Latin root, the university shouldstrive to represent the “whole”—of which secular thought is a minority in the world and history ofthought.
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bases. To take the above seriously and not fall prey to the prevailing “-ism” of aparticular academic culture, theology departments should allow theologians to makeexclusive truth claims about GATRG in their particular study of GATRG. If theuniversity does not welcome such an approach, then it is, in effect, requiringacademics, who operate from a particular epistemic base, to disguise or conceal whatthey recognize to be true and thereby deny or compromise their intellectual integrity.But does this not open the door to and, thereby, give credibility to every kindof fideistic affiliation? Not if there are criteria for determining whether a particulartheological approach is fit to engage in academic research in a particular university.Although an analysis of what criteria might count would require an essay of its own,I would suggest that criteria should include: explanatory power; a demonstrablerelevance to social flourishing; an openness to rigorous, pellucid, and transparentargumentation; and an importance for understanding the (past, present, and future)functioning of society. Even the most secular of thinkers are likely to acknowledgethat—although they may not endorse belief in God—theological belief has had andcontinues to have a profound impact on the history, culture, and intellectualcommitments of contemporary society—on principles of liberal democracy, forexample. This being so, they should hopefully be open to (what they will regard as)an in-depth religious phenomenology which, given the very nature of the situation,requires particular traditions to be explored in ways that take seriously thefoundational beliefs that constitute those traditions. For religious believersthemselves, there should be no question about the value of a scientific approach totheology, since theological convictions are foundational to their perception ofreality—to their understanding of the ultimate nature of all things.If academics are required to take a step back from the task of theology andengage in nothing more than a philosophical analysis of generic religious claims or asociological study of religious believers, they risk removing themselves from rigorousengagement with religious commitments. An exclusive or absolute commitment to aquasi-neutral (or pseudo-neutral) academic base, which will inevitably bereductionistic, will displace the possibility of the kind of conversation that engagesauthentically with the inner workings and convictions of the religious mind.The thrust of my argument here is that the university’s commitment to thepursuit of understanding is profoundly undermined if it is tied “religiously” to asingle, predetermined, and intrinsically areligious agenda. This does not mean thatthe religious believer cannot respect the areligious thinker’s freedom to take anareligious approach within the university (among the plurality of approaches). Nordoes it mean, of course, that the areligious thinker will be unable to draw many of thesame conclusions as religious believers. Indeed, I expect that areligious and religiousthinkers, who work together within the university, will find that it is perfectly normalfor their conclusions to be held by persons from various religious and non-religioustraditions (even when doing theology). Nonetheless, it is also not hard to recognizethat there is a major lacuna in the university if it does not allow religious believers toadopt a scientific approach to analytic theology. As we have seen, such a lacuna canbe recognized as such on the basis of academic commitments that are secular ortheological.
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What, then, does it look like for scientific theology to be undertaken within aplural academic context? The Christian, for example, would have no option but tothink that the true and faithful study of GATRG should operate from a Christianepistemic base and that she should take up her task accordingly. This does not mean,however, that the Christian should expect non-Christian Jews or Muslims, forexample, to approach the theological task in the same way that she does. Quite thecontrary: the Christian should expect them to pursue the scientific task of theology ina way that is true to their belief in GATRG. The Christian, of course, will continue tothink that they are deeply mistaken about how to approach the task of theologyscientifically. At the same time, the Christian is obliged to respect the fact that theywill think that she is deeply mistaken in this regard. She will continue to think thatscientific theology is tied to the triune God, and they will think that scientific theologyis subverted by taking into account what she regards as the essential condition for therecognition of what she knows.What I am proposing here is that the university theology department shouldbe a space that is open to the possibility of open and mutual disagreement about whattheology is. Again, therefore, it should not be so committed to an areligious agendathat it rules out any room for the religious voice. It should allow for and, indeed,facilitate a diverse conversation in which participants can articulate their theologicalpositions humbly and respectfully yet with conviction and honesty. If, by contrast,theists of differing views are expected to assume an equivalency to the various waysin which each of them talks about GATRG, then they will be required to conditionalizeon the basis of a theological view that they have no option but to assume to be false.What this effectively conveys is the endorsement of a form of theological relativism:the assumption that when we speak “truly” about GATRG in the university, GATRGshould be interpreted as relative to our own subjective perspectives. Such anapproach would require the vast majority of theists to commit to talking about Godin a way that was no longer accountable to the reality they purport to confess. Putsimply, they would be obliged to commit to a form of anti-realism which, if not self-referentially incoherent, would be incompatible with their most deeply heldconvictions. It would oblige them to assume a disingenuous stance.Does the position I am proposing entail that there are no areas in theologywhere Christians can share in a constructive scientific theological conversation withnon-Christian Jews and Muslims about the God of Abraham? While I cannot devotedue attention to this question here, I believe this is possible to the extent thatChristians, non-Christian Jews, and Muslims are referring to the same God, namely,the God who revealed Godself to Abraham. However, I am also of the view that if sucha conversation were to take place, the Christian, non-Christian Jew, and Muslimshould judge the theological fruitfulness or success of this conversation according totheir own respective commitments. Clearly, for example, they would have toacknowledge that they do not all share a belief in the incarnation or the triune natureof God, which are decisive to the Christian’s understanding of GATRG.What about atheists? The position for which I am arguing entails that it doesnot make sense to refer to atheists as adopting a scientific approach to theology. Ifsomeone does not think there is a God to talk about, then it is hard to conceive of howsuch a person can think it is valid to construe theology as a scientific enterprise. As I
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discussed above, she may be committed to studying the beliefs that others have aboutGod. Such a pursuit may well be described as “scientific” in a social-scientific sense.However, insofar as the atheist is not committed to a scientific pursuit of GATRG, itdoes not make sense to suggest that she is dedicated to a scientific approach totheology. If the atheist wants to take a more scientific approach to questions relatingto theology (or metaphysics), it would make more sense for her to see herself as beingcommitted to a task of scientific atheology: a commitment to studying (what sheperceives to be) the nature of reality according to the belief that God does not exist.Let me conclude this section by emphasizing that this position does not in anyway suggest that religious believers should have permission to be less respectful tothose who are outside their religious tradition within a university department oftheology. Indeed, Christian convictions would require the opposite. The argument is,quite simply, that the university should have a place for theological educators to teachtheology with intellectual integrity and thus in a way that is true to how they knowGATRG. Again, however, when such an approach is adopted, it should be undertakenwith transparency. That is, theological educators who approach their taskscientifically should make clear the underlying premises to which they arecommitted, and which lead them to teach in the way that they do.
4. A Note of Caution on TransparencyWhile it is important for the scientific theologian to be transparent, there also needsto be a cautiousness about how one goes about being transparent. Imagine, forexample, that an evolutionary biologist decided it was important, for the sake oftransparency, to qualify that her particular evolutionary theory was based on herChristian understanding of developmental biology. Such a qualification would belikely to invite the suspicion that she was projecting her own religious views onto hertheory in a way that undermined the scientific credibility of her research (even if thiswere not so). If, by contrast, she decided that, for the sake of transparency, it wasimportant to qualify that her study was based on paleontological research done inNorthern Africa, this would not be a problem. Why? Because, whereas paleontologycan clearly be seen to have a positive role to play in her study, it is much harder to seehow her Christian belief could have such a role—to the extent that openly drawing onher Christian understanding will be likely to lead her colleagues to call into questionthe validity of her methodology and the credibility of her conclusions.Now, suppose that a scientific theologian decided it was important, for thesake of transparency, to suggest that her claim that Jesus was the Son of God reflectedher Christian worldview. Such a qualification could risk inviting the perception thatshe is projecting her own subjective religious beliefs onto her understanding of thehistorical Jesus in a way that skewed the scientific nature of her study. Such aperception, however, would not be true to the Christian’s understanding. For theChristian, faithful understanding does not merely have a positive role to play in ascientific approach to theology, it is necessary for such an approach; without thecondition that is described as “faith,” she has no recognition of GATRG. To be clear,
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this is not because the reality of the triune God is grounded in a person’s faithfulperception. Rather, it is because it is by God actively delivering persons into a faithfulknowledge of God that God makes Godself known. And just as the life scientist needsto interact with the revelatory activity of the living world, so also the theologicalscientist needs to engage with the revelatory activity of the living God. In Christiantheological terms, this takes place by way of the risen and ascended Christ sendingthe Holy Spirit to facilitate that form of recognition that is constitutive of the epistemicfoundations of the Church—the knowledge that is constitutive of its existence.Clearly, there is much more to be said here. Suffice it to say, there is little questionthat a central commitment of Christian orthodoxy is the belief that it is not simply thefaith of the Christian that is foundational to the confession that Jesus is the Son of God;rather, it is the living Jesus Christ who is foundational to the faith by means of whichthe Christian confesses that Jesus is the Son of God. This is the sine qua non of scientificengagement with its subject-matter on the part of the Christian theologian. What thisentails is that if Jesus is not the Son of God, then a Christian approach to theology isnot, in actual fact, scientific; it is merely, as Athanasius saw so clearly, the mythicalprojections of a deluded scholar who fails to appreciate that the object of heracademic engagement is non-existent.What should be clear is that for the Christian who is committed to the task ofscientific theology, it is almost tautologous to endorse a Christian approach toscientific theology. Why? Because, for the Christian, the truest study of GATRG isinevitably Christian. It is not open to her to select from a variety of foreign religiousapproaches how best to study GATRG: Hindu theology, Buddhist theology, Islamictheology, or even non-Christian Jewish theology, etc. The only scientific way for theChristian to approach the task of scientific theology is to be faithful to the onemediator between God and humankind, Jesus Christ, the one who is known to befoundational to the mind of the Church (as articulated in and through the biblicalcanon, creeds, confessions, and the prayerful community in which she participates).
5. A Christian Approach to Scientific Analytic TheologyI have argued in this paper that it is possible for analytic theology to be distinguishedfrom philosophy of religion by allowing for the possibility of a scientific approach totheology: allowing persons to participate in an analytic theological endeavor whichseeks to be accountable to GATRG. By way of conclusion, I shall now propose how aChristian, who recognizes accountability to the triune God, might distinguish herscientific approach to analytic theology from a form of philosophy of religion.As I mentioned above, it is central to the faith of the Church that God revealedGodself in history. This means that analytic theology cannot restrict its focus tomeaning, value, or other categories cleansed from the irreducible particularity ofhistorical phenomena. Instead, its task is bound up with God’s historical self-disclosure in the spatiotemporal order. For these reasons, a scientific approach toanalytic theology cannot but be engaged with the central event of God’s self-revelation: the incarnation of Jesus Christ, the one in whom all things (all truth and
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reality) hold together—the one in whom, as Kierkegaard put it, the eternal hasestablished kinship with us in time (2003, 573).Now, for the analytic theologian who models her task on the analyticphilosopher, a commitment to God’s Word—and to the ordained words and dogmathat attest to it—is thoroughly inconvenient. The messiness of the Canon of Scripture,the mysterious complexity of the Trinity, the paradoxicality of Christology are justsome of the things that hold analytic theology back from being characterized by thesame kind of rigor, clarity, precision, and transparency that characterizes analyticphilosophy. Indeed, it may even be embarrassing for such a person to take up the taskof analytic theology. This can make it enormously tempting for the analytic theologianto shirk her responsibility to God’s Word and to the historical narrative at the heartof the faith. And herein lies the stumbling block for the analytic thinker who seeks totake a scientific approach to theology. There is a danger that, in order to embrace thevirtues of analytic philosophy (as they are understood by the cultures of philosophythat are embedded in this present world), the analytic theologian distances herselffrom the historical and ecclesial foundations of the Christian faith, opting instead togive her attention to a generic God of philosophy—a deistic or Epicurean “god” whois necessarily removed from the exigencies of the spatiotemporal order, “residing” ina transcendent noumenal realm that is infinitely removed from human history.When this happens, it is hard to see how analytic theology can be said to beanything more than a generic form of philosophy of religion. Once this step is made,it becomes all too easy for the analytic theologian to get on with the theological taskin a way that is indifferent to God’s engagement in and with the contingent order.Analytic philosophy of religion does not need to be (even if it can be) directed by therevelatory activity of God in the way that a scientific approach to theology must be. Ifthis happens, there can be no scientific approach to the task of analytic theology,conceived as a Christian enterprise, and any real distinction between analytictheology and philosophy of religion becomes hard to draw.That having been said, a glaring difficulty emerges with respect to what I havejust said. In and of itself, the human task of theology does not possess the capacity tobe anything more than a human venture. And because human language cannotdirectly represent God’s Word or refer to the reality of God as such, the questionarises as to how theology can ever be anything more than a form of humanspeculation. As a human venture, it would appear that it can do nothing more thantalk about mere human thoughts about GATRG. If this is the case, then it must be keptin check by the strictures of human reason. This does not mean that scientific analytictheology can be reduced to a generic philosophy of religion, which focuses merely onthe general religious ideas of human cultures. What it does mean, however, is that itis hard to distinguish a scientific analytic theology from Christian philosophy. How,then, can (or, indeed, why should) analytic theology claim to be anything more than aphilosophical endeavor—a conversation about the human ideas that emerge withinthe Christian religion?Let me first say that it is folly to suggest that the broader task of theologyshould not engage with philosophy—just as there is nothing wrong with seeingChurch history, the history of ideas, psychology, sociology, etc. as disciplines thatserve the task of theology. Again, it is not possible for us, as mere human beings, to
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talk directly about GATRG, unadulterated by attention to things that are not God orare not being discussed in relation to God. And when we undertake the task oftheology, we are using the tools of philosophical reflection. Indeed, it may be that,within the life of the Church, there are no clear boundaries between the human taskof Christian theology and that of Christian philosophy. In the eschaton, moreover, thedomains and methods of philosophy and theology may be indistinguishable.At the same time, it is also important to recognize that, as these two disciplinesoperate within the cultures of this world, they have distinctive audiences. Christianphilosophy tends to be distinguished by its concern to talk Christianly within anembedded philosophical culture that has a more secular language, criteria, and set ofcommitments. This means that the Christian philosopher will need to thinkdifferently about how to communicate herself than will the theologian who is perhapsmore likely to be engaging with an audience who is sympathetic to the truth ofreligion.On a related note, given the character of philosophy and the domain thatphilosophers inhabit, Christian philosophy may be slightly more likely to treat GATRGas a self-contained conceptual system associated with GATRG—although I am not atall sure that such an approach is any rarer in the world of theology. Given the inabilityof human thinkers to engage in pure theology (to talk or think directly about GATRG),it is inevitable that human beings may withdraw into conversations that areessentially inattentive to the reality of GATRG (to the extent that this involveshistorical engagement with irreducibly historical realities).In sharp contrast, the Apostle Paul saw the providence of God as essential tothe task of theology. He insisted that those who seek to know God must bindthemselves in prayer to the one mediator (1 Tim. 2:5), Jesus Christ, the only one inwhom pure theology is possible for humanity—or, in the words of the writer ofHebrews, Jesus the “high priest of our confession” (Heb. 3:1). Paul also interpretedthe coming of the Holy Spirit as essential to the Church’s task of theology—for “noone comprehends what is truly God’s except the Spirit of God” (1 Cor. 2:11).4 For Paul,it is because Jesus Christ sends the Holy Spirit to inspire the wisdom of the Churchthat it is possible for the Church to know God in a way that is true to its calling asGod’s kingdom come, on earth as it is heaven. So, for Paul, the theologian of the Churchmust seek to go about her task with the support of God’s revelatory activity. It is inthis way that the theologian can hope to be accountable to GATRG.
6. Five Distinguishing Features of Christian Analytic
Theology
4 To be clear, I would agree with William Abraham that persons should not appeal to the internalwitness of the Holy Spirit to support their particular theological agenda, to the extent that this witnessis treated “as the decisive and logically primitive warrant for one’s position” (1990, 442). At the sametime, I would also not want to deny that the witness of the Holy Spirit can help a person’s judgementwhen it comes to making the right decisions about doctrinal matters. There is much more to be saidhere, but that would take us beyond the scope of this essay.
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With this in mind, let me propose five distinguishing features of Christian analytictheology if it is to be characterized as the scientific study of God. As I understand it,from a Christian perspective, each of these five features can be seen to serve the taskof knowing God in a way that furthers a person’s scientific theological judgement andunderstanding. At the same time, they would not be seen to be appropriate in a moregeneric approach to philosophy of religion (or in the more generic forms of theologythat are indistinguishable from philosophy of religion).
First, the scientific analytic theologian sees her primary vocation as servingthe task of proclamation. Because she has been addressed by the Word of God, shefeels called to stand as a vocal witness to the historical events of God’s revelation—awitness who can hope to succeed in her task by means of the illumination of the HolySpirit. As this witness, she proclaims that the origin and pursuit of theology lie withthe spirit of wisdom and revelation that is given by the Lord Jesus Christ (Eph. 1:17).Without the revelatory activity of God, a person cannot know the triune God and,therefore, cannot know the one to whom theological words refer—such words wouldtake on a life of their own within a closed system of human thinking. Again, theologyconceived accordingly could not be anything more than a generic form of philosophyof religion or religious studies. To be clear, however, the human theologian is neverable to demonstrate directly that revelation is taking place in the midst of herconversation; that is, she can never demonstrate directly that God is present, activelyassociating theological talk with its object. Nonetheless, she can trust that this willhappen to the extent that her proclamation of the Gospel is accompanied by thepower of the Holy Spirit and is faithful to God’s self-disclosure in and through the solemediator. This is the givenness of the givingness of God’s self-revelation.5 That is, it isby faith in the givenness of God’s promise to keep giving Godself to be known, by thegiving of the Holy Spirit, that the Christian finds the audacity to believe that she canserve as an effective witness to GATRG.
Second, as I have mentioned, scientific analytic theology can be more thanphilosophy of religion by being grounded in the life of the Church—the communitythat is sustained by God to be the visible and living testimony to God’s self-revelation.Insofar as theology takes up the task of proclaiming God’s Word, it does so within thedomain of the Church. Therefore the past and ongoing witness of the Church mustcontinually direct the task of theology. To be clear, in making this statement I am notsuggesting that the task of theology must correspond to some abstract or past notionof “the Church.” I mean that the life of the theologian must be energized and directedby an active involvement in the life of the Church today. If this does not happen, thenthe Christian theologian will be likely to forget who she is and lose sight of what sheis doing.
5 There is an important difference between the “givenness of God’s self-revelation” and “the givennessof the givingness of God’s self-revelation”. Whereas the former suggests that God’s self-revelation hassomehow been handed over to the world to appropriate in, for, and by itself, the latter suggests thatGod’s self-revelation involves the continued giving of Godself to be known. It is by God’s ongoing actsof self-communication that human minds can become attuned to the true content of revelation.
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Third, the analytic theologian will always be aware that she is in apredicament—one that requires humility. As she seeks to go about her task in thisbroken world, guided by a broken Church, she will be humbled by the fact that herapparent rigor, clarity, and precision may have been facilitated by guiding principlesthat do not correspond to the grace of God. The lack of confidence that the analytictheologian has in her own judgement means that she will constantly be returning toScripture and to ecumenical statements to guide her. This will also move her to goabout her task prayerfully and worshipfully, humbly paying as much attention (if notmore attention) to the wisdom of the Church community as she does to the wisdomof her academic community.
Fourth, as I have also mentioned, the analytic theologian will forever be awareof the apparent awkwardness of her task. That is, her endeavor to be clear, precise,and rigorous in argument can appear to be hindered by her beholdenness to theunsystematic and complex nature of the biblical canon, to the exigencies of history,and to the human witness to it in the early ecumenical Church. Also, the analytictheologian will continually be held back by the unfathomable paradoxes that keepcropping up as she struggles to talk about things that lie beyond humancomprehension, but which confront her nonetheless. Yet, she is not frustrated bythese things. As she stands before God, this does not induce anxiety; it does notgenerate intellectual despair. It simply reminds her, once again, of the limits of thetheological task, as these things attest to the horizon where human words end andGod’s Word begins. So, rather than despairing, she finds joy and hope in the fact thatshe is not called to go about her task alone. Instead, she seeks to do no more than takepersons to the horizon of human words in an act of witness. She then proclaims thegood news of the only one who unites us with the other side of that horizon—the onemediator, Jesus Christ, who supports and directs us in ways that cannot be achievedwithin our own systems of thought.
Fifth, not only does analytic theology have its proper grounding in the life ofthe Church, but it also recognizes that its calling is to serve the Church. As a technicaland systematic discipline, it has the task of helping to bring rigor, clarity, precision,and transparency to the teaching of the Church (insofar as it can). But, again, this mustalways be a reciprocal relationship. As the analytic theologian seeks to bring clarityto the Church’s teaching, she should expect to be questioned by the Churchcommunity in a way that will help her to become clearer, more precise, and morerigorous about her unique subject matter—all so that she may be ever truer to thetheological task.These five distinguishing features of analytic theology are bound together bythe fact that the Christian analytic theologian recognizes that true talk about GATRGhas no past, present, or future apart from the grace of God. As God sustains theanalytic theologian in her task, she is sustained by an activity that cannot becommandeered by human reason—that cannot fit into one of her systematicdoctrines or theories, and which cannot be submitted to the Procrustean bed of our“-isms” or “-ologies.”In sum, for the Christian, it is by recognizing the grace of God that the analytictheologian does not need to accept that her fate is to be what, on the surface, shedirectly appears to be: a thinker who is unable to study “God” as anything more than
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a mere religious idea. Also, by grace and by the recognition of grace, the analytictheologian not only needs to trust and hope in the possibility of a scientific approachto theology; she can know that this is possible. More specifically, if Paul’s theologicalvision is accurate, then the analytic theologian is called to recognize that the study ofGATRG has no future apart from the crucified, risen, and ascended Christ. Toparaphrase Paul, if Christ has not been raised then both our proclamation and ourfaith is futile (1 Cor. 15:17). And if these things are futile, then so also is the task oftheology. What is more, it is because Jesus Christ is alive today, sending the HolySpirit, that the Church is maintained as the source of true theological understanding.What, then, does it mean for the analytic theologian to take seriously the workof the Holy Spirit and Jesus Christ, the incarnate Logos? It means she will recognizethat, ultimately, theological clarity comes with the Spirit giving the theologian theeyes to see and the ears to hear the one true Logos—the one true Word. Truetheological precision and reference come from directing attention to the one whomediates between God and humankind, and between humankind and God. Lastly,true theological transparency can only arise when the theologian’s testimony isinspired by the work of the Holy Spirit—when those listening to the theologian cometo know the one to whom she bears faithful witness—when their hearts and mindsare given to recognize the one true Lord whom the Christian theologian has beengiven to know.
ConclusionSo, in light of what I have just said, what does it mean to pursue theological enquiryin the university? Clearly, in the context of the ideological plurality of manyuniversities, the Christian analytic theologian may not be able to engage in all thekinds of activity that will best distinguish her task from philosophy of religion orChurch history. Each Christian theologian will need to think carefully about how shecan be accountable to GATRG according to the specific context and demands of herown university. While this essay has offered some guidance as to how one might thinkabout these things, I would not be so bold as to set forth strict guidelines that applyto every academic context. Each university will have distinctive concerns andpriorities that are formed by its engagement with its local context. And these mustinform the theologian’s decision as to how far or, indeed, whether she can adopt ascientific approach to theology. For example, in writing this essay, I have beeninformed by my own university’s strong commitment to diversity and inclusion—which the principal of the university describes as one of the “defining themes” of herprincipalship. Other academic contexts will prioritize a commitment to secularismover against diversity and inclusion. Or, indeed, in some countries, for example, acommitment to Islam may take priority. It should go without saying that contextualfactors such as these will have an impact on how a religious believer should approachthe academic task of analytic theology with wisdom. For these reasons, there may becontexts where that analytic theologian decides that it is not possible to pursue
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Christian analytic theology and so elects to engage in what would more accurately bedescribed as philosophy of religion.At the same time, if wisdom leads the analytic theologian to decide that sometheological practices cannot be an appropriate part of theological education within aparticular university, she may need to recognize that her academic context may notbe the best environment in which to seek to understand GATRG. It will then be up toher to think about how her academic work in analytic theology/philosophy of religioncan be resourced to serve a more scientific approach to analytic theology—that is, tothe extent that it is free to operate beyond the ideological constraints of her particularacademic context. It will also be up to her to think about how her practices outsideher academic domain might inform how she understands the specific nature of hervocation within that domain.6
6 I am grateful to the following persons for helpful feedback on an earlier version of this paper: MaxBaker-Hytch, Joshua Cockayne, Oliver Crisp, C. Stephen Evans, Mitch Mallary, Christa McKirland,Philip-Neri Reese, Stephanie Nordby, Jonathan Rutledge, Alan Torrance, Koert Verhagen, Charlotte vanOyen-Witvliet, and William Wood. I am also grateful for the financial support of the Templeton ReligionTrust.
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